Government Ownership Effect on Staffing Level and Financial Performance by AlAli, Musaed Sulaiman & Saeed, Tariq
 AlAli and Saeed / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 9 No 3, 2020 
  ISSN: 2147-4486 
 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
  
P
ag
e9
9
 
Finance & Banking Studies 
 
IJFBS, VOL 9 NO 3 ISSN: 2147-4486  
 Contents available at www.ssbfnet.com/ojs 
https://doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v9i3.836 
 
Government Ownership Effect on Staffing Level 
and Financial Performance: A Case Study on 
Kuwaiti Banks 
 
Musaed S. AlAli 
Corresponding Author: Department of Insurance and Banking, College of Business Studies, The 
Public Authority for Applied Education and Training (PAAET), Kuwait  
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-0802-5440 
 
Tariq Saeed 
Department of Information Science, College of Computer Science & Engineering, Taibah 
University, Saudi Arabia  
 
 
Abstract 
It has always been believed that government ownership would lead to overstaffing, inefficiency, and 
bad financial performance in any organization. This study aims to examine the effect of government 
ownership on staffing level and the financial performance of Kuwaiti bank over the period 2010-2018. 
Using panel OLS regression method based on the financial data of ten banks listed at Kuwait stock 
exchange (KSE), results showed that there was a statistically significant direct relation between 
government ownership and overstaffing and statistically significant inverse relation between 
government ownership and the financial performance of banks measured by return on assets (ROA). 
On the other hand, results showed that there was no relation between overstaffing and the financial 
performance of Kuwaiti banks. Results presented in this research shows the roll government ownership 
plays in inflating staff numbers in Kuwaiti banks for political rather than economic reasons and also the 
government influence on the decision making process in these banks resulting in lower financial 
performance. 
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Introduction 
Government sectors has always been lagging behind the private sectors in terms of efficiency, productivity, 
and financial performance. The time government officials’ need to deal with risks, opportunities, and changing 
market conditions is by far longer than that in private sector due to bureaucracy and long decision making 
layers. The ownership of government in banks, either complete or partial, would likely result in transferring 
some of the government management system culture into the way the bank operates. This imported 
government management culture would have an impact on the efficiency, productivity, and the financial 
performance of the bank. Governments own banks or shares in banks for different reasons, according to La 
Porta et al. (2002) there are two theoretical perspectives for government ownership in banks. The first one 
is the development theorists, which states that government ownership of banks facilitates allocation of credit 
to strategic and long-term socially desirable project that otherwise may not get private funding. The second 
one is the political theorists which suggests that government own banks to fund inefficient but politically 
desirable projects. None of these theories supports the ultimate goal of any business organization which is 
profitability and enhancing shareholders wealth. The reason for that is simply that government 
representatives in the bank board of directors do not own shares in the bank and their membership in the 
board was through appointing them by the government. This will make them focus more on what the 
government wants to do through their ownership in the bank and not what is in the best interest of the bank. 
Needless to say that at the end of the day those government representatives get their salaries from the 
government and not from the bank.  
 
There are 10 Kuwaiti commercial banks operating in Kuwait where the government partially owns 8 of them 
with an ownership ranging from 5.01% to 48.05%. This ownership can work as a double blade sword, banks 
with higher government ownership would have more access to government funds and higher volume of 
government transactions would go through the bank. On the other hand, having these privileges come with 
cost, government would have a say on how the bank operates and might in some cases force unfeasible 
decisions that affects the overall performance of the bank.   
 
This study aims to investigate the effects of government ownership on both the level of staffing and financial 
performance in Kuwaiti banks. Despite the large literature examining the effect of government ownership on 
the staffing level and financial performance in commercial banks. This research is the first, up to my 
knowledge, to examine these relations on Kuwaiti bank. To achieve the objective of this research, this study 
is structured as follows: introduction, literature review, methodology, empirical results, conclusion, and 
references. 
 
Literature Review 
 
There are many researches addressing the effect of government ownership on both staffing level and banks’ 
financial performance. Cornett et al. (2010) conduct a cross-country analysis, using the data of five Asian 
countries, namely, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia. They concluded that 
government ownership is associated with poor performance. Wang (2018) also concluded that ownership-
performance relation is negative for government ownership and positive for private ownership, and the 
difference between these relations is significant. Barako and Tower (2007) examined the effect of ownership 
structure in Kenyan banks on the financial performance of these banks and found that government ownership 
had a significantly and negatively influence on banks financial performance. Barth et al (2001) showed that 
government ownership of banks strongly correlates with banks inefficiency and lower productivity. Using 
CAMEL approach, Aswini et al. (2013) studied the soundness and efficiency of twelve public and private 
sector banks in India over the period 2000-2011. They found that private sector banks were at the top of the 
list, while public-sector banks were at the bottom of the list displaying low financial soundness in comparison.  
In terms of governments abusing their control on state-owned banks, Micco (2007) found that in developing 
countries government-owned banks are less profitable than their private counterparts and that the difference 
between the performance of public and private banks increases during elections years. Cornett et al (2010) 
looked at government ownership and government involvement in a country’s banking system and their effect 
on banks financial performance during the period 1989 to 2004. They found that government-owned banks 
operated less profitably and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks and the performance 
differences was more significant in those countries with greater government involvement and political 
corruption in the banking system.  
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On the other hand, Altunbas et al. (2001) studied bank ownership and efficiency in German banks and found 
little evidence to suggest that privately-owned banks are more efficient than their mutual and public-sector 
counterparts. AlAli and Al-Yatama (2019) examined the financial soundness of 9 banks listed at Kuwait stock 
exchange (KSE) over the period 2011-2016 using CAMELS model. Their results showed that Kuwait Finance 
House (KFH), which the government owns 48.05% of its shares, came at the 9th and last place in the list in 
terms of financial soundness. While Commercial bank of Kuwait, where the government does not own any 
shares in, came at the 8th place. Such result would imply that government ownership in banks does not really 
affects the financial soundness of the bank. 
 
Unemployment have a severe effect on any economy. For that matter governments try their best to create 
jobs and government and mutually-owned banks are one of the channels governments use to employ more 
people even if that means higher overhead costs due to overstaffing and deteriorating financial performance 
of these banks. Creating and maintaining unneeded jobs in government-owned banks is based on political 
goals and not on economical or financials goals. La Porta et al. (2002) and Barth et al. (2004) believe that 
government-owned and to a certain extend mutual-owned banks do more harm than good to the economy 
because the hidden political agendas prevent them from fulfilling their expected role of economic prosperity. 
Clarke et al (2002) when examining the determinants of banks privatization in Argentina found that state-
owned banks that are overstaffed had a poor financial performance and were the most difficult to privatize. 
They contributed the poor financial performance to the high staff expenses. They also looked at the political 
and social consequences of privatizing overstaffed bank since the new owners will layoff large number of the 
staff which in turn leads to higher unemployment which ultimately affects the government during election 
periods. Otchere (2005) found evidence that governments use banks to provide employment and subsidies 
to supporters in return for political contributions and votes. Using total assets-to-number of employees’ ratio, 
as a proxy of overstaffing, the study found the ratio to be US$0.66 million in government owned banks 
compared to US$0.93 million in private banks. The study also showed that even in partially privatized bank, 
when the bank decides to make politically unpopular decisions regarding the staff reduction or closing 
unprofitable branches, these decisions are revoked by government assigned board members. Gupta (2005) 
also found that partial privatization did not change the objective of the Indian government in using these 
banks to absorb surplus labor, and as a result the research found that partially privatized banks are usually 
not as competitive and efficient as a fully privatized one. 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to determine which banks suffer from overstaffing, firstly we need to estimate the optimal number of 
staff a bank needs. In order to do so, panel OLS regression is conducted using formula 1, as follow; 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑆?̂?𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑟𝑡       (1) 
 
Where 𝑙𝑛𝑆?̂?𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the estimated number of staff required by the bank, ROA is the return 
on assets, TA is the total assets of the bank, Lev is the bank leverage, and Br is the number of branches the 
bank has. In order to examine if the bank is overstaffed or understaffed, the difference between the estimated 
numbers of staff is deducted from the actual number of staff as shown in equation 2; 
 
△ 𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡𝑡 − exp 𝑙𝑛𝑆?̂?𝑡          (2) 
 
For examining the effect of government ownership (𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡) on the financial performance of the bank, equation 
3 is performed; 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀          (3) 
 
In determining the relation between government ownership and the staffing level difference in banks, 
equation 4 is performed; 
 
△ 𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀          (4) 
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Data and Empirical Results 
 
This research is based on the financial data of 10 Kuwaiti banks that are listed at Kuwait stock exchange 
(KSE) over the period 2010-2018. The data for this research were downloaded from Kuwait Institute of 
Banking Studies (KIBS) website. 
 
As seen from the descriptive analysis presented in table 1, the average number of staff employed per bank 
was 1144 employees. Bank had an average leverage ratio of 7.92 times with an average return on assets of 
0.93%.  By looking at skewness and kurtosis, it can be seen that they fall within the acceptable range of ± 
1.96 and ± 10 respectively indicating normal distribution.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive Analysis  
Staff ROA TA Lev Branches 
Mean 1144.47 0.93 6564.47 7.92 39.20 
Median 823.50 0.97 4137.60 7.84 37.00 
Standard Deviation 684.75 0.51 6479.39 1.67 17.68 
Kurtosis -2.34 2.98 8.04 0.68 -1.07 
Skewness 0.98 -0.72 1.68 -0.02 0.10 
Count 88 88 88 88 88 
 
Results of equation 1, is presented in table 2. Results show that the model can be labeled as a “good fit” 
since Sig F is less than 0.05. The model also has a good explanatory power with an adjusted R square of 
0.890 indicating that the model was able to capture 89.0% 0f the variation in the number of staff.  
 
Table 2: Panel OLS Regression Output 
Adjusted R Square 0.890 
 
Significance F 0.00 
Standard Error 0.193 
   
Observations 88 
   
 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 2.620 0.205 12.781*** 0.00 
ROA -0.126 0.050 -2.519** 0.0137 
lnTA 0.277 0.042 6.581*** 0.00 
Lev -0.0196 0.013 -1.480 0.143 
lnBr 0.624 0.072 8.684*** 0.00 
*,**,*** indicate confidence level at 90%, 95%, and 99% respectively.  
 
From the panel OLS regression results presented in table 2, the number of staff needed in the bank can be 
estimated as; 
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑆?̂?𝑡 = 2.62 − 0.126 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 0.277 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑡 − 0.0196 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 0.624 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑟𝑡     (5) 
 
In plotting banks data into formula 5, it can be seen from table 3, that six bank suffer from overstaffing while 
the remaining four showed understaffing. Commercial bank was the most understaffed bank in Kuwait while 
Kuwait finance house was the most overstaffed bank. Kuwait finance house was overstaffed by 550 
employees while Commercial bank was understaffed by 289 employees. National bank of Kuwait was the 
closest to their estimated staff needs with overstaffing of merely 4.41%. The table also shows that Kuwaiti 
government partially owns eight out of the ten banks, and only Commercial bank and Boubyan bank can be 
labeled as privately-owned banks. The Kuwaiti government has the highest ownership in Kuwait finance 
house, 48.05%, followed by Warba bank, 33.50%. It can also be observed from the table that the Kuwaiti 
government has the highest ownership in Kuwait finance house and that bank had the highest overstaffing, 
while Commercial bank was the most understaffed bank in Kuwait and the Kuwaiti government does not 
have shares in.  
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Table 3: Banks Under/Overstaffing 
 Actual Staff Estimated 
Staff 
Under/Overstaff* % Government 
Ownership 
AlAhli Bank 801 860 -59 -7.60% 10.13% 
Burgan Bank 710 910 -200 -
27.89% 
8.43% 
Commercial Bank 913 1202 -289 -
31.98% 
0.00% 
Gulf Bank 1470 1366 104 6.79% 5.01% 
National Bank of Kuwait 2207 2113 94 4.41% 5.60% 
Ahli United Bank 753 852 -99 -
12.82% 
12.01% 
Boubyan Bank 963 768 195 18.88% 0.00% 
Kuwait Finance House 2496 1946 550 21.94% 48.05% 
Kuwait International 
Bank 
630 596 34 5.57% 8.04% 
Warba Bank 319 300 19 6.71% 33.50% 
*(-) indicate understaffing 
 
Table 4 presents the relation between government ownership and both return on assets (ROA) and the 
divergence in staff number from the estimated staff required. In terms of the effect of government ownership 
on return on assets (ROA), it can be seen that there is a statistically significant inverse relation between the 
two variables. This might be caused by high employees’ expenses due to overstaffing, forcing the bank into 
providing loans with low interest rates for political reasons, or keeping some unprofitable divisions or 
branches in the bank open for election purposes. By looking at the relation between government ownership 
and staffing levels, the results shows a statistically significant direct relation between them implying that the 
Kuwaiti government uses these banks as hiring channels, resulting in overstaffing. To force the banks that 
the government have a small or no ownership in them into hiring more local workers, the council of ministers 
issued a law in early 2019 which increases the minimum percentage of Kuwaiti workers in the banking sector 
from 64% to 70% which is roughly around 676 new jobs for Kuwaiti workers. Finally when examining the 
relation between overstaffing and the financial performance of the banks, results shows no relation between 
these two variables meaning that over or understaffing does not affect the financial performance of Kuwaiti 
banks to a certain extend. This can be caused by the support the government provides to the banks in terms 
of very low interest rate deposits which in turn increases the interest rate margin the bank makes on loans 
they provide to their customers. These deposits are used as compensation for high staffing expenses due to 
overstaffing.   
 
Table 4: Panel OLS Regression Output 
Dependent ROA △ 𝑺𝒕𝒕 ROA 
Independent 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒕 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒕 △ 𝑺𝒕𝒕 
R Squared 0.0638 0.1587 0.0002 
Standard 
Error 
0.4980 0.1786 0.5147 
Sig F 0.0176** 0.0001*** 0.8932 
 Coefficient t-Stat P-Value Coefficient t-Stat P-Value Coefficient t-Stat P-Value 
Intercept 1.046 14.92*** 0.00 -0.084 -3.34*** 0.0012 0.936 16.980*** 0.00 
independent 
Variable 
-0.883 -2.42** 0.0175 0.527 4.027*** 0.0001 0.038 0.1345 0.893 
*,**,*** indicate confidence level at 90%, 95%, and 99% respectively.  
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research was to examine the effect of government ownership on both the staffing level 
and the financial performance of Kuwaiti banks. Using the data of 10 banks listed at Kuwait Stock Exchange 
(KSE) over the period 2010-2018, results showed that there was a significant direct relation between 
government ownership and the level of staffing in these banks which indicates that the Kuwaiti government 
uses its ownership power to force banks into hiring more staff for political reasons. The results also showed 
significant inverse relation between government ownership and the financial performance of the banks which 
overstaffing is one of the reasons for it.  
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